yr13_ia_2007_howard_d

=D. Analysis=

India in the early 1800’s was essentially ruled by the British. The Indian government was predominantly under the control of the East India Trading Company, a commercial enterprise based in India that provided the British government with a local office with which to communicate. The East India Trading Company was designed to monitor Britain’s trade from a more central location. Meanwhile, they exchanged proposals from the Indian government for consent or adjustments with the British. Ultimately, the Prime Minister of Britain could oversee and permit all the activities of the Indian government without leaving England.

With the East India Trading Company came the Board of control. Set up in 1784, the board was “to superintend, direct, and control, all acts, operations, and concerns which in any wise relate to the civil or military government or revenues of the British territorial possessions in the East Indies” [1]. Composed of a president, three commissioners and two under-secretaries, the Board oversaw all the dispatches that passed through the East India Trading Company and was responsible for instructing, paying and dismissing British officials.

This elaborate system of control is the physical representation of early nineteenth century British policy in India. With increased Russian activity in Asia, the British government was desperate to preserve its empire. This Russophobia can undoubtedly account for the intricate system of the foreign office of India. With the complicated hierarchy of British officials in its employ, it is difficult to know who exactly was in charge of the East India Trading Company. However, it was not only this perpetual state of caution that influenced British policy in India. It was commonly believed that the British government’s involvement in India was motivated by pity. This civilisation of illiterate “paupers” could not have possibly had the ability to rule themselves. The British government itself did nothing to deter this widely held idea. On the contrary, it became the tool of the government’s exploitation of the people and country of India. One of the reasons India was not completely crippled by the British in the early nineteenth century was the Earl of Ellenborough, Edward Law (1790-1871).

From early on in his political career, Edward Law harboured a sentiment for foreign independence. When the Austrians were permitted to invade Italy in 1821, Law was shocked that his government “could witness a contest between despotism and freedom without taking any interest in the issue”. He also professed much sympathy for Greece in the Greek War of Independence [2]. Moreover, when Russians capture Erzerum in 1829 [3], he described the events as if they were a personal blow: “Every success of theirs in that quarter makes my heart bleed… I consider it a victory gained over me, as Asia is mine.” Law, as opposed to the British government in general, showed great esteem for the Indian culture and was not motivated merely by the economy. He seemed to be deeply committed to the moral obligation he thought England bore to the Indian people. In a meeting with the chairs of the Board of control he made a famously bold statement: “I will not sit here to sacrifice India to England”. He later referred to this in his personal diary as “a sentiment which escaped me, but which I feel to be correct, not only socially but politically.” He was deeply inspired by the tradition of the country and the warmth of its people, exclaiming his views often to the offence of his political peers. Needless to say, when the opportunity arose for him to travel to India and take up the position of President for the Board of Control, Law accepted without hesitation. It was evidently a wise decision on the part of the Duke of Wellington, then Prime Minister, as it was noted that “no president was ever more assiduous or better informed”. Indeed, Law insisted on acquainting himself with every aspect of business that passed through the Board of Control. Demonstrating relentless enthusiasm and diligence in every aspect of his work, it seemed that Law had finally found his vocation. From then on, India became his life’s work.

As President for the Board of Control, Law’s first motion was to open the Indus for commerce. This radical idea was inspired by his dealings with the Maharajah Ranjit Singh of the Punjab. A few months into his new post, Law assumed responsibility of responding to gifts the Maharajah bestowed upon the Crown. During his association with Singh, Law became curious about the ill documented Trans-Indus region. His ensuing enquiries informed him of the great potential for extensive trade routes the River yielded. The Indus and its tributaries were navigable for seven hundred miles with the capability to accommodate two hundred ton vessels. Law was eager to “have the credit of having originated a measure which, if effected, will be of incalculable value” and proposed that the mission conducting the Maharajah’s gift should also carry out a survey of the valley.

There can be little serious doubt that a powerful stimulus behind this project was the prospect of a Russian invasion. Like most official Englishmen of the early nineteenth century, Law tended to greatly overrate the Russian annexationist intentions and capability. His fears were not unique, which instigated an increase in paranoid propaganda. One such alarmist publication of 1829, by Colonel De Lacy Evans, //On the Practicability of an Invasion of British India//, greatly affected Law and also the Duke of Wellington. Although confident an attack could be repelled, both Law and the Duke were eager to exercise preventative methods. The control of the Indus would be indispensable in the preparation against such an eventuality. The result of their caution was that in 1831 Ranjit Singh conceded to sign an agreement of perpetual friendship. In 1832, treaties were negotiated with Singh and the Amirs of Sind for peaceful mercantile access to their roads and rivers. Primarily, it seems that Law’s motivation in these proceedings was to benefit from the expansive trade routes the Indus provided and thereby bolster the British economy. However, the entire scheme would not even have been acknowledged had it not been for Law’s intense curiosity and desire to expand his knowledge of India. He relished his time in India like no other British official of the period and was genuinely interested in its culture and people: a sentiment not shared by many others.

In other economical matters, Law had noticed that the abolishment of England’s monopoly on China trade was long overdue. On this subject, Law refused to succumb to the Duke’s hesitancy. He frequently brought the motion to the Prime Minister’s attention and in 1829, after petitions for free trade had been made by citizens of London, the Duke finally agreed to consider it. However, the task of persuading the entire House of Lords was a huge undertaking. England made £2,245,000 a year in trade payments, so, needless to say, the government was anxious about whether they could maintain this sum if they lost their monopoly. Law and the Chairs managed to prove that the monopoly did not increase payments to England by comparing it to competitive prices of Chinese produce. But there were concerns that, should the monopoly be abandoned, the East India company would not have sufficient funds to govern India effectively. So Law turned his attention to resolving the companies finances before pursuing his proposal.

Law soon discovered that there was a deficit of £1,000,000 in the Indian revenues. Before he could continue campaigning for the China trade monopoly to be thrown out, he had to prove that the debt could be cleared. He did it, not by simply raising taxes in India, but by cutting down on expenditure through “more efficient administration”. Law personally prepared plans of reductions mounting to £300,000 a year, and by 1830 expenditure of the East India company had been reduced dramatically. In fact, by 1835 the company had made a surplus profit of nearly £1,500,000. Law stated that “we cannot increase the revenue until we diminish taxation, and by diminishing taxation enable the people to acquire wealth, and to rise elastically as the weight which now crushes them is removed”: a sentiment which paid off. Law made sure that he left detailed instructions for his Whig successors in order for them to carry out the finalisation of the charter renewal without the China monopoly.

Here is another instance where Law assumed the responsibility of protecting the people of India. It would have undoubtedly replenished the East India company’s debt quicker by increasing taxation. However, Law saw that this would cripple the Indian population and instead sought a long term alternative that would benefit both England and India. He had come to see that the “moral obligation England bore to India” included improving “the standard of living of the masses above a perilous margin of subsistence”. Law had actually noticed that the majority of Indian citizens were living in poverty and wanted to do something about it. He was one of a very few people that actually saw this task as one of British responsibility. His attitude reflected a belief that England could not only exercise its influence over the parts of Indian that yielded profit; any involvement in India made them responsible for the wellbeing of it’s people.

Undoubtedly, Law’s most radical proposals were involved with the renewal of the East India Trading Company charter, which was due to expire in 1833. It is believed that the imminence of this action was a factor in his acceptance of Presidency of the Board of Control, somewhat verified by the revolutionary suggestions he submitted. Firstly, Law was of the strong opinion that the control of the Indian government should be revoked from the East India Trading Company and instead transferred to the Crown. He had developed growing resentment towards the East India company for some time, referring to them in a memorandum to the Chairs as “a set of Merchant’s clerks” who have allowed “indulgent laxity”. He hoped that if the Crown had responsibility of the Indian government, officials in its employ would respect the name of the King and benefit from the “efficiency, the vigour, and the celerity of the King's Government”. The company had proven itself to be inefficient and borderline useless. Law was fair enough to suppose that a trading company should display some competence in financial affairs, but even in this field they had showed themselves to be virtually incapable. In Bengal, civil charges had risen by two millions pounds in six years. In British India as a whole, there was a potential shortfall of one million pounds for 1829.

The Duke of Wellington was not prepared for such a radical request. “Swayed by early recollections and anxious not to estrange the London commercial interests”, the Prime Minister was only willing to alter minor details in the charter. Revoking responsibility of the Indian government from the East India company and placing it directly in the hands of the Crown would have meant that the British government had sole responsibility of the control of India, and it was undoubtedly this that influenced the Duke’s decision. Purely in the interest of maintaining his good relationship with the Duke, Law did not pursue the scheme. Although he did not change his convictions, and reported in his diary: “my disposition to terminate the existence of the Company increases the more I see of them”. This dedication to the improvement of the Indian government is another example of Law striving to benefit the people of India. His concerns with the East India company agitated him perhaps more than other British officials because of his commitment to the development of India; a process he perceived to be taking all together too long.

What infuriated Law most about the state of the East India company was it’s incompetence and complete lack of efficiency. Law estimated that it took two and half years for a report and response to be sent and received. The distance between India and England and the near primitive methods of delivering mail between them meant that months could go by without any formal dispatches from India. Law marvelled that, in the long intervals which often separated the mails, the home authorities might well have forgotten that they had an Indian empire to govern. Because it took so long for correspondence to reach England, the common feeling among the company clerks was that there was no need for urgency as it would takes months to arrive anyway. This “downright laziness” frustrated Law as he was a firm believer in diligence and attentiveness. In 1830 Sir John Malcolm sent a steamboat with mail from Bombay to Suez, and in spite of a ten day delay to restock coal, it reached Suez in thirty-three days then England within seventy-two days. Ellenborough believed that at least fourteen days could be saved on this time and became determined to make it standard to receive replies within a year. He put the proposal to the Court of Directors that steam vessels be used to transport mail both within India and to Europe. The directors however complained of the expense when “there was no important intelligence to communicate”. It is of little wonder that Law exclaimed in his diary: “I will never make these people feel they are at the head of a //state//!” Typically, Law rebelled and entered into negotiations with the Admiralty anyway about using a steam vessel from Alexandria.

As well as this, Law ordered that two copies of all communication between the British and Indian governments be made, so that the Board of Control could receive a copy of everything more quickly. This made more sense than the board waiting for correspondence to go through England, potentially taking months to arrive back in India. It also allowed them to draft their own responses while waiting for replies from England. Law designed this new system to speed up communications between the two governments, which became apparent when it was calculated that he had cut down the average response time by an entire year. The scheme also increased the level of control the board had, as they were consulted on every document and proposal. The directors opposed Law’s improvements, because, Law believed, the changes altered the system to which they had become accustomed to, one which allowed “indulgent laxity” and “leisureliness”.

By this time, Law renowned for his radical ideas for improvement of the Indian government. His next shocker for the Prime Minister was a suggestion that the people of India be allowed to work in administration as civil servants. This suggestion was not met by much support, on the contrary, the majority of parliament was close to appalled. Most Englishmen were weary of giving the “Natives” any great deal of responsibility, perhaps under the impression that it would go to their uncivilised heads. However, Law was adamant that it was vital to the future welfare of India. He even proposed that Indians of the upper class should be invited to study at Universities set up for the English residents in India, as they could not very well be appointed by the Indian government with no education. When Lord William Bentinck went to India as Governor-General in 1828, he espoused the cause. Even with the backing of the Governor-General however, the progress was slow and greeted with caution by British officials. However, Law hoped that in the future Indian people could fill even the highest ranking posts in the government.

It can be argued that Law’s motives were practical, rather than humanitarian. However, a share of his zealous and dedicated conduct must be attributed to the commitment he felt he owed India on behalf of England. In 1829, he wrote to the Governor-General to instil that “we have a great moral duty to perform to the people of India”. Again, Law demonstrates a unique attitude towards India. His interests in the nation were not merely fiscal, unlike the popular sentiment in England. Law used his authority to endeavour to improve and strengthen the Indian government, no doubt in the hope they would one day govern themselves.

< This is too long. I cut some sections but can’t decide what to keep, it all seems important! > Word count: 2688

1. As stated by the bill passed through both Houses in 1784 by William Pitt, British Prime Minister 1783-1801, 1804-1806. 2. More information is featured in this text : //The War of Greek Independence, 1821 to 1833//, by W. Alison Phillips, 2007. 3. Erzerum was returned to Turkey in the Treaty of Adrianople, signed on September 14th, 1829, by Count Aleksey Orlov of Russia and Abdul Kadyr-bey of Turkey.