yr13_ia_2007_burge_d

=Analysis (500-650 words)=

Analysis

In February 13th; 1945 the Russian army was marching towards Dresden, led by Marshall Koneff and supposedly a strategic strike was needed in Dresden to help the Russians reach their destination unhindered so they could take control of the city. An attack on the major cities would also cause confusion and hinder the German troops in the west with reinforcing the front line with 42 divisions. Other reasons for the attack seem to be that if Dresden wasn’t attacked then the attacks on Berlin and Leipzig would be useless as Dresden could be used to relay supply’s to the attacked cities.

Although there are other reasons that come through that make the bombing of Dresden seem like an unnecessary part of the war effort but military objectives to the attack also play a big part in the investigation. Other sources show that the allies were worried about how far the Russian troops were advancing into Germany and didn’t want them to gain such a big city in Germany such as Dresden. Part of the briefing of the RAF was ‘lets show the Russians, when they arrive, what the bomber command can do’, this one quote could be interpreted very differently, firstly perhaps showing that the soviets were lucky in having the western countries on there side or perhaps a threat, boasting the allies power and maybe showing that the allies were always reproachful about the USSR and shows a beginning of the cold war. So therefore if the purpose of bombing Dresden was just to show the Russians the strength of the RAF and if the deaths of thousands of innocent people had to happen in the process surely that makes a war crime.

Another objective of the allies could have been the destruction of trade in the area. When looking at the extent of the damage it does seem that the targets were more general attack on the people and trade ratherthan military strategic points.

A report in Germany showed that the bombings had destroyed ‘24 banks, 26 insurance buildings, 31 stores and retail houses, 6470 shops, 640 warehouses, 256 market stalls, 31 large hotels, 26 public houses, 63 administrative buildings, 3 theatres, 18 cinemas, 11 churches, 60 chapels, 50 cultural-historical buildings, 19 hospitals including auxiliary, overflow hospitals, and private clinics; 39 schools, 5 consulates, 1 zoological garden, 1 waterworks, 1 railway facility, 19 postal facilities, 4 tram facilities, 19 ships and barges’. This is opposed to the 19 military hospitals and a few number of military facilities with little significance. There is a great difference in this than the overall aim of targeting oil production facilities; jet aircraft factories and submarine yards.

What made the attack worse was the fact that there were over 200, 000 refugees in excess to the population of 642, 000 so the amount that were left dead is difficult to find out, the extent of the death in Dresden was a huge decrease in moral for Germany, with so many people families there. One idea was that with the Russian advance approaching, ‘the bombing would appear closely coordinated with the attack, therefore resulting in an even greater loss of moral’ [Firestorm p21 Sydney Bufton].