ia_2010_hag_d

=D. Analysis (500-650 words) Tips]=

= D. Analysis = Sufficient materials are still not available, more than twenty years after the over-throw of the Pahlavi monarchy **(why is this? Elaborate!).** Research has instead followed two track, the publication of documentary collections and the analysis of these documents [i]

// Result of Emergence of Protest (1977): //
The Shah stated in 1960 that "There is a limit to the speed which men and nations can develop in freedom". Conspiracy theories such as this **(This is not a conspiracy theory at all - you need to change this)** have a long history in Iran. Many Iranians have attributed their country's fate to the machinations of the great powers. Take for example the toast Carter made to Iran in 1978, "Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, your majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect and love which your people give to you". "Many Iranians believed Carter was lying and wanted the Shah thrown out, why he brought Khomeini in, not realizing how powerful he would turn out to be." [ii] Had the respondent and other Iranians been conspiracy minded **(your use of conspiracy needs to be reflected upon here)**, then it should have shaped their decision to participate in protest. If they suspect that Carter hated the Shah, they may have taken advantage of the opportunity of the situation. If they believed that the U.S human rights campaign was tying the Iranian governments 's hands in its dealings with oppositionists, "They may have felt freer to protest" [iii]

// Result of Shi'i Appeals (1977): //
Today it may seem like the public observance of mourning rituals in Iran was always a political act. But it seems the political implications of this cultural practice were an outcome of the protest movement's success, not a cause of it **(nicely phrased).** The Islamists intentionally transformed the traditional practice **(on explicitly pragmatic grounds)** to mobilize the masses. In addition to demonstrations in Iran, the Islamist Protestants pioneered in 1963, novel forms of revolt: Politicized mourning rituals. To the extent that the revolutionary movement constructed it's own culture. It ruined attempts a retroactive prediction. **(I don't know what this means and I don't think you do either)** Mainly for me **(delete "for me")** the Islamists managed to transform the heightened piety of Ramadan, beginning on August 6, into political mobilization. Ramadan had previously been considered as a purification of the body, but Khomeini said in 1978 that "this year the holy month is a model...for revenge against injustices of the regime" Iran was losing focus on peace and centring on Revenge. The regime began to tighten, martial law was declared and a night time curfew was instated. Tanks and troop carriers stationed at all major intersections in the city "and residents worried that the soldiers brought to the city were "butchers" from a minority group who would kill for a dollar" [iv]. Fear was present and control was fading.


 * This needs to be framed as a DEBATE - evidence that the mourning WAS a cause of the revolution, then your criticism of this view (with reference to historians / commentators who have been on each side). If it is just framed as a DESCRIPTION you will not get a lot of marks)**

// Result of the General Strike (1979): //
Whereas Khomeini cited religious causes but used a discourse of economic grievance, Islamic leftists in Iran did the opposite. The groups cited economic causes for the revolution but used an Islamic discourse. [v] Class Conflict was to be transcended by Islamic unity, the vanguard party was likened to Islamic prophethood, and class struggle was termed religious struggle (jihad). [vi] This meant that Polarisation had started to occur. A common attribute of the causes of revolution **(ungrammatical),** examples being the Spanish Civil war and the Russian Civil War with polarisation between the Reds and the Whites.


 * No quotes here, so your footnotes are rather meaningless.**

// Result of the Military (1978 to 1979): //
During huge protests the Islamists agreed not to shout "Death to the Shah". The revolutionary council allowed liberal oppositionists to broker an agreement with military government, which announced two days before the events that it would permit the processions on Tasu'a and 'Ashura so long as these remained orderly. [vii] Up to the last minute it was unclear whether the government agreed in good faith, or whether hard-liners might use the occasion as an excuse for yet another violent crackdown. [viii] These acts demonstrated inconsistency and confusion within the Persian government. Possible signs towards a collapse. it is almost unheard of for a revolution to involve as much as 1 percent of a country's population. The French, Russian and Romanian revolutions (1789, 1917 and 1989) may have passed the 1 percent mark. Yet in Iran more than 10 percent of the country marched in anti-Shah demonstrations on December 10 and 11 of 1978. [ix] Finally fears of state repression continued more or less unabated until the last moment of the Monarchy. Khomeini's Revolutionary Council in Tehran took no minutes, made no recordings, and generated no written documents until two weeks after the victory of the revolution out of fear of state repression. [x]

[i] Charles Kurzman "The unthinkable revolution in Iran" 175 [ii] Respondent 51, interviewed by Charles Kurzman in Istanbul, Turkey, November 25, 1989. //Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents,// January 2, 1978, 1975. [iii] Charles Kurzman "The unthinkable revolution in Iran" 15 [iv] Hitselberger "letter," 119-120; Seyed Hasan N urburkhsh, //Yadvareh-ye Nehzat-e Eslami,// vol. 1, 142; "Butcher" see Hickman, //Ravaged and Reborn,// 7. [v] Charles Kurzman "The unthinkable revolution in Iran" 80 [vi] Radjavi, //La révolution Iranienne et les Moudjahédines,// 109-117 [vii] Ruhollah Khomeini, pronouncement of November 23, 1978 in Khomeini, //Islam and Revolution//, 242 [viii] Charles Kurzman "The unthinkable revolution in Iran" 120 [ix] Charles Kurzman "The unthinkable revolution in Iran" 121 [x] Charles Kurzman "The unthinkable revolution in Iran" 124