ib_chantreau_r

** Total Word Count: 1980 ** ||
 * International school of Toulouse
 * Why did Hannibal not take Rome after the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C  ||
 * Internal Assessment  ||
 * ** Raphael Chantreau ** ||
 * ** Centre Number: FR042 ** ||
 * ** Candidate Number: **
 * ** Candidate Number: **




 * "a bust, which may be a representation of Hannibal in later life, although there are no definite images of him" //Adrian Goldsworthy// ||


 * = Goldsworthy, Adrian, (2007), The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265-146 B.C, Cassel, ISBN: 978-0304366422, pg 24 = ||

= Contents = Section A: Plan of Investigation……………………………………………….pg 2 Section B: Summary of Evidence………………………..……………………pg 3-5 Section C: Evaluation of sources……………………………...………………pg 6-7 Section D: Analysis……………………………….….………….……………...pg 8-10 Section E: Conclusion…………………………………………………………..pg 11 Section F: List of Sources……………………………………………………..pg 12-13 Section G: Appendices ………………………………………………………..pg 14 = =

= = = A. Plan of the Investigation =

This investigation will focus “Why did Hannibal not take Rome after the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C.?”. I will seek to determine what factors made Hannibal not march onto Rome. These will include; military, political and psychological aspects. I chose this topic because Hannibal is regarded as a renowned military genius along the likes of Napoleon, and I was deeply intrigued as to why he took such a decision when he was successful in Italy. In order to answer this question, I have structured my analysis section using the following method: firstly I will established what reasons made him act the way he did and secondly find which reasons seems the most reliable given the sources at hand. In order to keep the scope of the study manageable, I have made use of a variety of carefully selected sources, in particular a wide range of books [1] written by established historians, some first-hand sources [2], and data [3]. [4]

// Words: 158 //

= B. Summary of Evidence = Prior to Hannibal’s extraordinary campaign in Italy, Carthage had suffered from a war between its empire [5] and the Romans; this was the First Punic War [6]. The outcome of the First Punic War was unscrupulous for Carthage; they had to sign the Treaty of Lutatius [7], this resulted in a hatred of the Roman Empire especially for Hannibal [8]. This hatred of Rome and her imperialistic mind-set made Hannibal start his astonishing march through the Pyrenees and the Alps as well as through the Rhône with one of the biggest armies [9]. Polybius summarizes his passage through Spain as //“he made himself master of all this territory, took several cities by storm and completed the campaign with remarkable speed”// [10]. The river Rhône was the next step and Hannibal only met a small resistance [11]. The next step, to enable Hannibal to enter Italy, was the Alps; Appian [12] says: “//with great difficulty, six months after leaving Spain, and after suffering heavy losses, he descended from the mountains to the plain”// [13]. Hannibal was now in Italy and had chosen to encamp nearby the River Trebia [14]. Hannibal had 40 000 men [15], the Romans on the other hand had a total of approximately 40 000 men [16] , however Hannibal won [17] the battle by using, //“The classic encirclement tactics”// [18]. After the Battle of the Trebia, winter arrived and so the fighting ceased, however when it was over Hannibal [19] started plundering the region of Etruria [20] .Hannibal had with him a grand maximum of 55 000 men [21] whereas the Roman had only 30 000 [22]. Hannibal won the battle in less than four hours and the casualties for the Romans were devastating [23]. After the Battle of Lake Trasimene, Hannibal moved on to Cannae where he made his camp; at the same time two new consuls had been elected L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro. Hannibal wanted to have a battle with the Romans however the latter did not, Hannibal sent his Numidian cavalry to provoke the Romans [24] .Once more Hannibal won the battle, earning Polybius’ praise “The year 216 BC marked the apogee of Hannibal’s military career, with Cannae the foremost demonstration of his brilliance” [25] ; the Roman army had suffered the biggest death count [26] and Hannibal, again according to Polybius, had lost 5 700 men [27]. Now that Hannibal had proven that he was an undefeatable in a foreign territory as well, he had to decide what he was going to do after the flagrant massacre. However what were the possible options for Hannibal, one of his general had said//: “The gods have not given all their gifts to one man. You know how to win a victory, Hannibal; you do not know how to use it.”// [28] ?Maharbal states that Rome was at only five days of walk from their position which is false because Rome was over two hundred and fifty miles away and it would have taken three weeks for Hannibal to get there. Furthermore if Hannibal would have wanted to reach Rome in those three weeks his army would have needed to walk at a pace of more than fifteen miles a day [29]. Hannibal also needed either the help of the Carthaginian senate or the help of the Roman allies; however the Carthaginian senate had refused to send help rapidly as the enemies of Hannibal were in the senate and believed that “successful generals did not ask for money” [30]. The Roman allies had also not split up with the Romans, and this is what Hannibal relied upon to conquer Rome.

Word Count: 597

= = = = = = = = = C. Evaluation of Sources = =__ Appendix A: Extract from //Ab Urbe Condita (The History of Rome) Book 22.51//, by Titus Livius. __= = The __origin__ of source A is a passage written by Livy [31], a Roman scholar. This extract describes a post-Canna discussion between Hannibal and his generals, which depicts him deciding whether or not he should march onwards to Rome. From this we can deduce that the __purpose__ is to inform the reader of Hannibal’s decision after the massacre at Cannae, to not march on Rome, and to show that, “ // That day's delay is believed to have saved the City and the empire // ”. On this basis, the source is __valuable__ because it shows the intimacy of Hannibal and his generals [32] and the strategist mind set of Hannibal. Nevertheless it also has some __limitations__ in the sense that it is a pro-Roman account and thus anti-Punic, meaning that Livy would intend to glorify Rome and its empire even after blatant defeats such Cannae or Trebia [33]. The fact that the historian considers the source as secondary [34] conveys the sense of lack of evidence or an incomplete account of events [35]. Furthermore, another limitation of this source is the translation from Latin to English where words could have been (i) mistranslated and/or lost (ii) throughout different translations by different translators. = = Word Count: 197 = =__ Appendix B: Extract from Hannibal: A History of the Art of War among the Carthaginians and Romans down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C., with a detailed account of the Second Punic War, by Theodore Ayrault Dodge __= = The __origin__ of source B is an extract written by Theodore Ayrault Dodge, an American soldier who fought in the American civil war. The extract explains why Hannibal was right to not march onto Rome. From this we can deduce that its __purpose__ is to present the reader with reasons as to why Hannibal did not undertake this task, for as Dodge says; “If Hannibal had marched on Rome, he would have ended the war, perhaps, but by the destruction of his own army.” On this basis the source is __valuable__ because it provides concrete evidence to the reader as to why Hannibal did not advance to Rome. It is considered a secondary source as it was written in the 19th Century; therefore Dodge might have had to deal with incomplete and/or conflicting information [36]. However the author is a military historian [37] as well as a soldier, showing an extensive knowledge of military strategies [38] and first-hand war experiences [39]. Nevertheless it also has some __limitations__ in the sense that Dodge primarily uses Livy’s works [40], and Livy’s works were flawed, in turn rendering some of Dodge’s passages of limited use to the historian. = = Words: 193 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = D. Analysis = =__ Different Interpretations. __= = The decision of not marching onto Rome is at the centre of many debates among the specialised historians. Even though, the majority of them agree with Hannibal’s decision of not storming Rome, there are some who believe Maharbal was right. B.D Hoyos [41], one of the rare historians to disagree with Hannibal, thinks that “This was virtually a Punic version of Cunctatio [42]. It was just about the worst time for caution to overpower boldness." and concludes that Hannibal was "a great man who was not quite great enough". On the other side of the spectrum, Adrian Goldsworthy [43] mentions that Rome was 250 miles from Rome and it wasn’t defenceless [44], furthermore, he says the soldiers were physically exhausted. Mommsen [45] writes; "[That aim] was the aim dictated to him by right policy, because, mighty conqueror though he was in battle, he saw very clearly that on each occasion he vanquished the generals and not the city and that after each new battle the Romans remained just as superior to the Carthaginians as he was personally superior to the Roman commanders. That Hannibal even at the height of his fortune never deceived himself on this point, is worthier of admiration than his most admired battles." = = Words: 204 = = = = = = = = = = = =__ Critical Analysis. __= = All the sources present in this investigation, all try to answer the question; why did Hannibal not go for Rome after Cannae? All historians in the field agree that Rome had suffered a crushing defeat against the Carthaginians [46] ; however Hannibal’s decision of not continuing farther to Rome is still controversial. The sources used in Part C: Evaluation of Sources try to give reasons for Hannibal’s choice, Livy argues that Hannibal was too busy with thinking about the risks and the consequences, and hints that he was busy with the serious political difficulties. However Livy tends to be the less reliable source in debates around Hannibal [47], because he was a Roman historian and especially anti-Punic therefore he tried to glorify Rome where ever it was possible. Furthermore, Livy wrote 150 years after and did not have all the sources available. = = Dodge’s extract shows a lot more detail in terms of why Hannibal couldn’t seize Rome after Cannae. Dodge being a military expert, is particularly reliable given the sources he used, he shows that Hannibal had less military troops than Rome and especially that Rome was twelve days’ march away. Moreover, he states that Hannibal needed both, help from Carthage and desertion of the Roman allies, and he continues with: “Without the first he must soon succumb. Without the last he could never conquer Rome.” Even if the source is secondary, the fact that it is a military historian and strategist outweighs the possible lack of information coming from sources. Although it is important to bear in mind that his post-Cannae description is largely based on Livy and he contradicts himself when he mentions that Hannibal had no siege machinery; many other sources disagree with him as well as Livy such as John Shean [48] who says that Hannibal, when storming the citadel of Tarentum used high wooden towers against the walls. = = Words: 311 = =__ Historiography. __= = When investigating events in the past it is important to look at the political agenda, Livy for example, had a specific political agenda being anti-Punic. This could possibly mean that he chose the right facts which would enable him to glorify Rome. E.H Carr displays this in his quote [49] where he says that it is the historian who chooses his facts and will find the right one. Furthermore, he particularly states that studying the historian [50] before looking at the facts presented, it will give an insight in that era of time. In terms of Livy the numbers of casualties are always less than other ancient sources such as Polybius, or Appian and this is why Polybius tends to be more reliable as he was a historian [51]. = = Words: 126 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = E. Conclusion = = In conclusion, Hannibal was right in not attacking Rome, because he couldn’t do much without the support of the Carthaginian senate nor without the presence of the ex-Roman allies. Rome was still protected and could in theory raise an army, furthermore, Hannibal had hoped that the Roman senate would seek piece however it did not and on the contrary refused any of Hannibal’s ransom. G.P Baker [52] summarises Hannibal’s decision in a short line; “The world had two thousand years to reflect over the problem; and Hannibal formed it in a much shorter time” = = Hannibal still is of great importance nowadays because of his military strategies and innovative tactics. The encirclement technique used at Cannae has been studied by other great generals such as; Napoleon, Clausewitz, Schlieffen and Montgomery. Barbara Tuchman [53] explains how Hannibal influenced the German strategy during the First World War; ‘To achieve decisive victory, Schlieffen fixed upon a strategy derived from Hannibal and the battle of Cannae. (...) Two thousand years had passed since Hannibal’s classic double envelopment of the Romans at Cannae. “Field gun and machine gun had replaced bow and slingshot”, Schlieffen wrote, “but the principles of strategy remain unchanged.” [54] = = Words: 194 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = F. List of Sources = =__ Books (Listed alphabetically by author name): __= 1) Baker, G.P, (1999), Hannibal, Cooper Square Press, ISBN: 978-0815410058,

2) Cottrell, Leonard (1961), Hannibal, Enemy of Rome, Da Capo Press (A member of the Perseus Books Group), ISBN: 0-308-80498-0

3) Dodge, Theodore Ayrault (1896),A History of the art of war among the Carthaginians and Romans down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C., with a detailed account of the Second Punic War, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, ISBN: 3-1761-01799275-1 = 4) Goldsworthy, Adrian, (2007), The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265-146 B.C, Cassel, ISBN: 978-0304366422 = = 5) Hoyos, B.D, Hannibal’s Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western Mediterranean, 247-183 B.C. (2003), Routledge, ISBN: 978-0415299114 = = 6) Livy, Ab Urba Condita Books 21-25, translated by Alfred John Church and William Jackson Bride in 1883, Macmillan and Co. ISBN: 3-1761-01543107 = = 7) Mommsen, Theodor, (2010), The History of Rome, Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 978-1108009737 = = 8) M.R van der Werf, (2002), Battle of Lake Trasimene: Ground Warfare, Stanley Sandler, ISBN: 1-57607-344-0 = = 9) Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire; Book 3, (1979 [55] ) translated by W. R. Paton in 1923, William Heinemann LTD, IBSN: 3-3333-18269-3198 = 10) Shean, John F. (1996), Hannibal’s Mules: The Logistical Limitations of Hannibal’s Army and the Battle of Cannae, 216 B.C, Historia 45

11) Tuchman, Barbara W. (1989),The Guns of August, Macmillan Pub Co, ISBN: 978-0026203111

12) Weirs, William (2004), 50 Battles That Changed the World, New Page Books, (A Division of the Career Press Inc, ISBN: 1-56414-746-0 =__ Website: __= = 1) [|www.livius.org/ap-ark/appian/appian_hannibal_00.html], Appian’s History of Rome: The Hannibalic War, Jona Lendering, (1996), date accessed: 30/06/2013 = = = =__ Textbooks __= = 1) Alchin, Nicholas, (2006), Theory of Knowledge, Hodder Education (A Hachette UK company), ISBN: 978-0-340-91476-2 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = Appendices =
 * __ Appendix A: __**

// "...Hannibal's officers all surrounded him and congratulated him on his victory, and urged that after such a magnificent success he should allow himself and his exhausted men to rest for the remainder of the day and the following night. Maharbal, however, the commandant of the cavalry, thought that they ought not to lose a moment. 'That you may know', he said to Hannibal, 'what has been gained by this battle I prophesy that in five days you will be feasting as victor in the Capitol. Follow me; I will go in advance with the cavalry; they will know that you are come before they know that you are coming.' To Hannibal the victory seemed too great and too joyous for him to realise all at once. He told Maharbal that he commended his zeal, but he needed time to think out his plans. Maharbal replied: "The gods have not given all their gifts to one man. You know how to win a victory, Hannibal, you do not know how to use it. That day's delay is believed to have saved the City and the empire." //** Titus Livius, //Ab Urbe Condita (The History of Rome)// Book 22.51 **


 * __ Appendix B: __**

// “Historians often blame Hannibal for not marching on Rome immediately after Cannae. That he did not, is one of the most decided proofs of his ability. A Pyrrhus could do so reckless a thing ; but not a Hannibal., Rome was twelve days' march away. She had over forty thousand men to defend her strong walls. How could Hannibal, with his less than forty thousand men and no siege machinery, expect to take Rome, when allied forces, numbering hundreds of thousands, would certainly assemble in his rear? Hannibal was bold beyond any one in history in invading Italy, but he was not rash. He would have been insanely rash to march on Rome. He had two things to count upon, help from home, and the disaffection of the socii. Without the first he must soon succumb. Without the last he could never conquer Rome. What he now did was to seek to influence the socii to join his cause. As a soldier alone, with his limited forces, he could not win the peace he aimed at. A great part of his time must be devoted to the political side of his problem. He now lay on his arms, with a military record unequaled in Roman annals, and sought to win his end by a persuasive policy. He looked farther into his problem than those "who would have him do a foolhardy thing because it was brilliant. Rome rose to the occasion as never before. Not for an instant did she dream of peace, compromise, or anything but resistance to the last man. If Hannibal had marched on Rome, he would have ended the war, perhaps, but by the destruction of his own army.” //** Theodore Ayrault Dodge, //Hannibal: A History of the Art of War among the Carthaginians and Romans down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C. ,with a detailed account of the Second Punic War// **

[1] Weirs, William (2004), 50 Battles That Changed the World, New Page Books, (A Division of the Career Press Inc, ISBN: 1-56414-746-0 Dodge, Theodore Ayrault (1896),A History of the art of war among the Carthaginians and Romans down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C., with a detailed account of the Second Punic War, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, ISBN: 3-1761-01799275-1 Cottrell, Leonard (1961), Hannibal, Enemy of Rome, Da Capo Press (A member of the Perseus Books Group), ISBN: 0-308-80498-0 [2] Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire; Book 3, (1979) translated by W. R. Paton in 1923, William Heinemann LTD, IBSN: 3-3333-18269-3198 Livy, Ab Urba Condita Books 21-25, translated by Alfred John Church and William Jackson Bride in 1883, Macmillan and Co. ISBN: 3-1761-01543107 [3] Shean, John F. (1996), Hannibal’s Mules: The Logistical Limitations of Hannibal’s Army and the Battle of Cannae, 216 B.C, Historia 45 Goldsworthy, Adrian, (2007), The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265-146 B.C, Cassel, ISBN: 978-0304366422

[4] For a more detailed accout of what sources were used in the essay see section F: List of Sources [5] //Cottrell, Leonard (1961), Hannibal, Enemy of Rome, Da Capo Press (A member of the Perseus Books Group), ISBN: 0-308-80498-0, p 8// : The source says that the Carthaginian Empire which was situated next to Tunis, in the North of Africa, was a colony founded by the Phoenicians. Phoenicians were merchants and traders who had established their country along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean, between the mountains of Lebanon and the sea. [6] //Cottrell, Leonard (1961), Hannibal, Enemy of Rome, Da Capo Press (A member of the Perseus Books Group), ISBN: 0-308-80498-0, p 9:// The First Punic War originated because the Mamertimes, a group of Italian mercenaries, started ravaging the areas on Sicily until they collided with the Kingdom of Syracuse (also in Sicily). The Mamertimes were defeated by Hiero II the tyrant of Syracuse at the battle near Mylae. Because of this, the Mamertimes appealed to both Rome and Carthage to help them. Carthage accepted to help them and to send in some troops. The Mamertimes however were sceptic about this new alliance and appealed to Romans again, Rome feared a Carthaginian conquest in Sicily, as it would give them an advantage if they went to war with Rome. Therefore the Roman general public senate agreed and sent troops to Sicily. [7] //Cottrell, Leonard (1961), Hannibal, Enemy of Rome, Da Capo Press (A member of the Perseus Books Group), ISBN: 0-308-80498-0, p 9:// The terms of the Treaty were very punitive for the Carthaginians; they had to leave Sicily to the Romans and had to pay an indemnity of 66 tons of silver to the Romans. [8] //Livy, Ab Urba Condita Books 21-25, translated by Alfred John Church and William Jackson Bride in 1883, Macmillan and Co. ISBN: 3-1761-01543107:// There is a story, too, of Hannibal when, at nine years of age, he was boyishly coaxing his father Hamilcar to take him with him to Spain (Hamilcar had just finished the African war, and was sacrificing before transporting his army to that country), how the child was set by the altar, and there, with his hand upon the victim, was made to swear that, so soon as he could, he would be the enemy of the Roman people. [9] //Cottrell, Leonard (1961), Hannibal, Enemy of Rome, Da Capo Press (A member of the Perseus Books Group), ISBN: 0-308-80498- p 260:// At the start of his conquest totalled over 100, 000 men, which 90, 000 were foot soldiers and 12, 000 were cavalry. [10] //Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire; Book 3, (1979 ) translated by W. R. Paton in 1923, William Heinemann LTD, IBSN: 3-3333-18269-3198, Book 3,35, p 21 **: “**// but he was involved in heavy fighting and suffered some severe losses.” Furthermore Polybius mentions the fact that; “He detached from his army, a contingent of 10 000 infantry and 1000 cavalry to be commanded by Hanno, and deposited with him all the heavy baggage of the expeditionary force. At the same time he sent home an equal number of troops.” [11] //Cottrell, Leonard (1961), Hannibal, Enemy of Rome, Da Capo Press (A member of the Perseus Books Group), ISBN: 0-308-80498-0//, quoting //Polybius// describes the scene as such; the Gallic tribe of the Volcae had opposed the crossing of the river by the Carthaginians and was ready to fight. Hannibal and a local friendly tribe were making rafts to cross the river, and while they were doing this Hannibal had sent a small squad of cavalry further up the river to cross it and attack the Volcae from the rear. Once the opposition was gone Hannibal could set up a camp and wait until the elephants crossed the river. [12] //Appian, Roman History, translated by Horace White, Book 1, 4 pp. 309-11// [13] //Appian, Roman History, translated by Horace White, Book 1, 4 pp. 309-11:// When he came to the Alps and found no road through or over them (for they are exceedingly precipitous), he nevertheless boldly began to climb them, suffering greatly from the cold and deep snow (…). //Cottrell, Leonard (1961), Hannibal, Enemy of Rome, Da Capo Press (A member of the Perseus Books Group), ISBN: 0-308-80498-0, p 83:// The source recalls an anecdote in which Hannibal and his army encountered a huge rock which blocked the passage and behind it was a few more rocks too. To resolve the problem Hannibal told the army to first start a fire adjacent to the rock and then to rush with vinegar filled wineskins, this caused the rock to be fragile enough so that Hannibal’s troops could destroy it with hammers. [14] //Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire; Book 3, (1979 ) translated by W. R. Paton in 1923, William Heinemann LTD, IBSN: 3-3333-18269-3198//, //Book 3, 115:// Polybius states that his camp was just near the Roman camp which was control by the two Roman consuls; Publius Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius Longus. These two consuls were not sure on what to do, Tiberius Sempronius Longus was anxious to go to battle as it was his last year as a consul and he had to bring glory back to Rome if he wanted to be re-elected. [15] Both Polybius and Livy agree to these numbers, and furthermore they say he arrived with 90 000 men; //Polybius; Rise of the Roman Empire, Book 3,72// and //Livy Ab Urba Condita Book 21,54-55// [16] The estimates range from 40 000 to 42000, between Polybius and Livy. [17] //Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire; Book 3, (1979 ) translated by W. R. Paton in 1923, William Heinemann LTD, IBSN: 3-3333-18269-3198, Book 3,75;// After this battle the Romans had lost a maximum of 32 000 men and Hannibal lost a maximum of 5 000. [18] Hoyos, B.D, Hannibal’s Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western Mediterranean, 247-183 B.C. (2003), Routledge, ISBN: 978-0415299114:“The classic encirclement tactics which have made the Punic general famous among military theorists” [19] //Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire; Book 3, (1979 ) translated by W. R. Paton in 1923, William Heinemann LTD, IBSN: 3-3333-18269-3198, Book 3, 116:// Polybius states that after the winter Hannibal had developed opthalmia, a severe eye infection. He received no treatment and therefore he lost his right eye. [20] //Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire; Book 3, (1979 ) translated by W. R. Paton in 1923, William Heinemann LTD, IBSN: 3-3333-18269-3198,// //Book 3, 116:// This source states that during this time, two new consuls had been elected too, these being Gnaeus Servillius Geminus and Caius Flaminius. The two consuls had their armies which was following Hannibal’s troops all through the region until they were trapped between the hills and Lake Trasimene. [21] //M.R van der Werf, (2002), Battle of Lake Trasimene, Ground Warfare, ed Stanley Sandler, p 486// [22] //M.R van der Werf, (2002), Battle of Lake Trasimene, Ground Warfare, ed Stanley Sandler, p 486// [23] Livy, Ab Urba Condita Books 21-25, translated by Alfred John Church and William Jackson Bride in 1883, Macmillan and Co. ISBN: 3-1761-01543107, //Book 22,5,//: The source clearly says that the Romans had lost 15 000 and then another 6 000 were captured by Maharbal. Hannibal on the contrary had only lost 2 500 and more who died because of wounds. Livy states further that the fight was so terrible that neither of the armies could feel the earthquake which “other threw large portions of many of the cities of Italy and turned rivers; and leveled mountains with an awful crash.” [24] //Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire; Book 3, (1979 ) translated by W. R. Paton in 1923, William Heinemann LTD, IBSN: 3-3333-18269-3198,// //Book 3, 117:// The Roman army had a total of 90 000 men and the Carthaginians had 50 000 men, one of the biggest army ever united. [25] //Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire; Book 3, (1979 ) translated by W. R. Paton in 1923, William Heinemann LTD, IBSN: 3-3333-18269-3198, Book 3,// 110 : [26] //Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire; Book 3, (1979 ) translated by W. R. Paton in 1923, William Heinemann LTD, IBSN: 3-3333-18269-3198, Book 3,117:// The source clearly states that the Roman army had lost 70 000 men, and 10 000 were captured [27] //Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire; Book 3, (1979 ) translated by W. R. Paton in 1923, William Heinemann LTD, IBSN: 3-3333-18269-3198, Book 3, 117// [28] Livy, Ab Urba Condita Books 21-25, translated by Alfred John Church and William Jackson Bride in 1883, Macmillan and Co. ISBN: 3-1761-01543107 [29] //Shean, John F. (1996), Hannibal’s Mules: The Logistical Limitations of Hannibal’s Army and the Battle of Cannae, 216 B.C, Historia 45 Hannibal//. This source states that the Carthaginians would have also needed to not forage for ressources and for that he would have needed 544, 920 pack animals, however he only had a round 20 000. [30] //Appian, The Hannibalic War, Book 3, 16 p 32 9 www.livius.org/ap-ark/appian/appian_hannibal_00.html// [31] Livy was born in 59 B.C, he was a Roman historian as well as advisor to the emperor Claudius. [32] Regarding the historiography enveloping the debate, Polybius, a historian who wrote his book closer to the time of the battle than Livy, makes no mention of the general Maharbal and the quote: “The gods have not given all their gifts to one man. You know how to win a victory, Hannibal; you do not know how to use it”. Polybius might be more reliable as he wrote much closer to the period than Livy and he had no political agenda as Livy did. [33] The Battle of the Trebia caused 15 000 deaths and the Battle of Cannae had cost the lives of 50 000 men [34] Livy’s life being between 59 B.C and A.D 17 [35] As Polybius’ accounts of the battle of Cannae were lost throughout history. Polybius was a historian born in 200 B.C and held the view that historians should only chronicle events where they have interviewed a primary source. He is also the first historian to coin the notion of having factual integrity and avoiding bias. [36] Dodge states that Hannibal did not have siege machines, whereas Appian and Livy (in Book 21.16. 11-12 and in Book 23.17. 4-6) describe the use of siege machines in both Nola and Acerrae, showing contradicting research and sourcework. [37] He has written numerous other books on the lives of generals such as Ceasar and Alexander the Great where he analysis the battles and strategies as well as the causes and outcomes. [38] As shown by his evidence in terms of geographical location of the battle of Cannae, explained by his multiple travels to Italy where he studied the old battlefields with a military angle [39] Theodore Ayrault Dodge fought in several battles during the American Civil War, such as Gettysburg, where he witnessed first-hand a bloodbath of a battle, where he lost his left leg. [40] As Polybius’ works involving the time period of 216 B.C. have been lost throughout the ages [41] B. D Hoyos is an Associate Professor in the Department of Classics and Ancient History, School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry at the University of Sydney, Australia. [42] The word cunctatio comes from the Roman General Fabius Maximus Cunctator (The Delayer). He got this nick name because of his peculiar military strategy at that time, which consisted in a scorched-earth tactic where Hannibal was most likely to pass. He believed that the only way to defeat Hannibal was to wear him down and that the Romans should never engage but just follow him. [43] Adrian Goldsworthy is a British historian who is specialised in ancient Roman history and wrote four books about the Second Punic War and Cannae. [44] Livy tells us the military capacity of Rome after Cannae in book 23.14 "...The consul did not fail in any single duty which he had to perform, nor did the Dictator show less energy. The force now available comprised the two legions which had been enrolled by the consuls at the beginning of the year, a levy of slaves and the cohorts which had been raised in the country of Picenum and Cisalpine Gaul. The Dictator decided to still further increase his strength by adopting a measure to which only a country in an almost hopeless state could stop, when honor must yield to necessity. After duly discharging his religious duties and obtaining the necessary permission to mount his horse, he published an edict that all who had been guilty of capital offences or who were in prison for debt and were willing to serve under him would by his orders be released from punishment and have their debts cancelled. 6,000 men were raised in this way, and he armed them with the spoils taken from the Gauls and which had been carried in the triumphal procession of Gaius Flaminius. He then started from the City with 25,000 men..." [45] Mommsen was a German historian, who received the Nobel Prize in literature. He is well known for his works on Roman history especially his //History of Rome// which appeared in three volumes. [46] The Roman Army had lost 50 000 men. [47] The more credible source being Polybius, however his passages about post-Cannae have been lost. [48] Shean, John F. (1996), Hannibal’s Mules: The Logistical Limitations of Hannibal’s Army and the Battle of Cannae, 216 B.C, Historia 45pp. 159-187 [49] //Alchin, Nicholas, (2006), Theory of Knowledge, Hodder Education (A Hachette UK company), ISBN: 978-0-340-91476-2 p 192:// The facts are like fish swimming in a vast and murky ocean, and what the historian catches will depend partly on chance but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish in and what bait he chooses – these two facts of course being determined by the type of fish he wants to catch. By and large the historian will get the facts he wants. [50] //Alchin, Nicholas, (2006), Theory of Knowledge, Hodder Education (A Hachette UK company), ISBN: 978-0-340-91476-2 p 192:// Study the historian before you begin to study the facts. Find out what bee he has in his bonnet. When you read a work of history, always listen out for the buzzing. If you can detect none either you are tone deaf or the historian is a dull dog. [51] Who believed that when studying events, it is important to have a primary account of that event and to avoid bias [52] G.P. Baker, author of //Hannibal (1999)// [53] Barbara W. Tuchman was a liberal American historian who wrote //The Guns of August// which is the history of the prelude to the First World War, and it won the Pulitzer Prize for General non-fiction in 1963. [54] B. W. Tuchman, //The Guns of August //, Macmillan, 1962 //, //p. 20. [55] Last edition