yr13_ia_2007_durrant_b

=Summary of Evidence (500-600 words)= In 1964 the conflict in Vietnam was escalating, and it was becoming increasingly clear that the South Vietnamese were incapable of combating the threat from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The American presence in Vietnam was currently restrained to a role of “advisory assistance at all levels of the military establishment”[|[1]] and limited air support, the targets of which were designated by the Vietnamese[|[2]].
 * B.** **Summary of Evidence**

John F. Kennedy had been assassinated the previous November, and his successor, Lyndon Johnson, did not favour Kennedy’s proposed policy of withdrawal from Vietnam, instead proposing increased military presence in Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin incident would allow Johnson to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which served as Johnson’s legal justification for escalating American involvement in the Vietnam war, to combat “communist aggression”[|[3]].


 * (this paragraph is getting into value judgements, which need to be in section D, not here...)**

The Gulf of Tonkin incident itself, as alleged by the Johnson administration[|[4]] was an pair of attacks upon the U.S.S. //Maddox// and the U.S.S. //Turner Joy//, occurring on the 2nd and 4th of August. The first attack involved three P-4 patrol torpedo boats attacking the U.S.S. //Maddox// while in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, engaged in “innocent passage”. The Johnson administration insisted that it had done nothing to provoke the attack, but did not respond to this initial attack.

On the night of August the 4th, both the U.S.S. //Maddox// and U.S.S. //Turner Joy// were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin[|[5]], reported enemy contacts and several torpedo attacks. The following day, President Johnson would address Congress, citing these “further deliberate attacks” as pretext for a resolution approving the use of force in South-East Asia.


 * The following paragraphs ALL belong in section D...NOT HERE.**

However, newly acquired evidence casts the incident in a very different light. The U.S. was at the time carrying out covert naval intelligence operations and commando attacks against North Vietnam, and had been since January 1964.[|[6]] These operations were funded by the U.S., used American equipment, and attacked CIA-designated targets. The missions were led by Americans, with South Vietnamese Special Forces. At the time of the first attack, the U.S.S. //Maddox// was, rather than engaging in “innocent passage”, was conducting a mission with the purpose of monitoring and recording the North Vietnamese radar and electronic response to 34-A raids that day. The North Vietnamese may have made the logical connection between the 34-A raids, and the presence of the Maddox, provoking the attack. The events of August 4th are more disputed; SIGINT reports sent at the time of the alleged attack show confusion as to the size and actions of the enemy[|[7]], with doubt expressed over whether there was an attack at all. No physical evidence of an attack was found, with no wreckage, nor damage to either American destroyer. Reliable sources, including many available to the Johnson administration at the time, indicate that there was no attack on August the 4th, instead attributing much of it to “Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen”[|[8]]. Perhaps the most conclusive proof was the testimony of one of the American pilots, sent from the //USS Ticonderoga// to support the two American destroyers. Commander James B. Stockdale states in his memoirs, "There was absolutely no gunfire except our own, no PT boat wakes, not a candle light let alone a burning ship. None could have been there and not have been seen on such a black night."[|[9]]

The Gulf of Tonkin incident was provoked and greatly exaggerated by the American Government to give a pretext for war. Military reprisals by the American Government were swift, but limited, and political ones were just as swift, but unrelated to the Gulf of Tonkin - a blank cheque for war was given, but that cheque would be used in no relation with the Gulf of Tonkin.

If the Gulf of Tonkin incident did not propel America to start Rolling Thunder, or deploy ground troops in the summer of 1965, then what pushed them to do so? The answer lies not in American foreign policy, but in domestic politics. Johnson’s sudden ascension to the presidency brought with it his need to prove himself, to establish his reputation before the presidential elections came about. The collapse of another country to the forces of Moscow-directed Communism would all but condemn his prospects of re-election to failure. It was this need to keep South Vietnam out of the hands of Communism that drove the Americans to war.

[|[1]] The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition. Volume 1, Chapter 4 “U.S. and France in Indochina, 1950-56" [|[2]] Verify – Bright Shining Lie might have something on this. [|[3]] President Johnson’s Message to Congress, August 5th 1964. [|[4]] Source for Johnson administration account needed [|[5]] The U.S.S. //Maddox// was joined by the //Turner Joy// shortly after the first attack, and, on Johnson’s orders, both proceeded to sail back up the Gulf of Tonkin. [|[6]] Operation 34-A - National Security Archive's microfiche collection, //U.S. Policy in the Vietnam War, I: 1954-1968//. [|[7]] Relevant SIGINT reports… [|[8]] Pages 9-10; //Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers,// Ellsberg, Daniel (2002). [|[9]] Admiral James B. Stockdale, "Another Gulf, Other Blips on a Screen," //The Washington Post//, August 7, 1988, p. B7