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How decisive was Spanish intervention in world war two? //Plaque commemorating the liberation of Paris the bottom plaque reads «To the Spanish Republicans main component of the Dronne column»// [] Name : Borja De La Viuda Candidate Number : International School of Toulouse (FR042) Word Count: 3963 Contents Abstract – Page 3 Introduction – Page 4 Investigation- Page 5 · Structure of investigation - page 6 · Analysis of Sources – page 6 · Analysis – Military – page 7 · Analysis – Economy – page 9 · Analysis – Covert Operations – page 10 · Analysis – Different Interpretation – Page 12 Conclusion – Page 13 Bibliography – Page 14 __ Abstract __ This essay investigates the question “How decisive was Spanish intervention in world war two?” This investigation makes use of a variety of sources: The first source is a book written by the historian Evelyn Mesquida called “La Nueve: Los españoles que liberaron Paris” the book describes the story of the ninth company of Leclerc’s armored division, composed solely of republican Spanish soldiers. “La División azul: Sangre española en Rusia 1941-1945” by Xavier Moreno Julia tells in detail the story of the Blue Division, formed of volunteers and sent by Franco to help Hitler in his Russian campaign. “Españoles en la segunda guerra mundial” by Luis reyes briefly describes all of the spanish soldiers involved in the war. Two other books where used, one about the diplomacy between Hitler and Franco and the other about the spy Garbo. This investigation also uses a number of websites. The investigation is structured in the following manner, firstly the structure of the analysis is briefly described, and then several sources are analyzed to be followed by the analysis of the investigation divided into three sections: military, economy, covert operations and different interpretation. Finally a conclusion to the investigation is approached and described. The conclusions of this investigation is that the Spanish intervention cannot be considered to be solely decisive for the outcome of the war, rather only decisive for certain factors and for certain people, like for example the French which had their capital liberated by Spanish soldiers. World war two has been studied many times; it is one of the most important events in the 20th century. It has been clearly established that the two main belligerent sides were those of the allies, composed of the Russians, British, Americans and French, and the axis, which included Germany, Italy and Japan. Yet there were many other countries involved in the war, such as the case of Spain, which was a non-belligerent country, yet participated actively in the conflict, thus making it important to define the extent and the decisiveness of its participation. Resolving the issue of the Spanish participation has still got a significant relevance today since while the soldiers on both sides have all been recognized and have had memorials built for them; there isn’t any which remembers those Spanish soldiers that died for either of the two sides. Therefore if the Spanish did in fact result to be of a major determination in the outcome in the war, they should be not only remembered but also rewarded as much as any of the other soldiers of the other nations which were involved in the war. There is the special case of one of the companies of soldiers which were promised that the allies would in fact help them to deal with Franco if they provided their aid against the Germans, however when they did so the allies let them down and never fulfilled such promise, all the while leaving the soldiers to be forgotten. This investigation will firstly consider the ways in which the Spanish were decisive and ways they weren’t decisive in terms of military, this section will therefore include all the military actions done by the Spanish soldiers on both sides of the war. Following this the investigation will consider the economic aid provided by the Spanish dictator Franco to the Germans and the ways that this aid proved crucial for the war or whether it was not important at all. Next consideration will be given to the aid in terms of covert operations both in Spain and outside aided by the Spaniards and whether they seemed to be of any use at all to the outcome of the war. “La Nueve: Los españoles que liberaron paris.” [1] Is a book which has certain values to a historian studying this topic. These values come in terms of its origins, the writer Evelyn Mesquida has become an expert in this specific unit after ten years spent “weaving the threads of an infinite story never included in French history books” [2]. The purpose of this book is also to inform by the use of interviews with the survivors themselves to create a “meticulous reconstruction of the story which was never recognized of the Republicans who fought against Nazism and liberated Paris.” [3] Yet this source also has its share of limitations. In terms of origins, the book is based mostly on interviews with the survivors, which although were first hand witnesses, were also very old and might have left out certain details. In terms of its purpose, the writer herself admitted that her goal was to have “France recognize that it owes some of its freedom to more than 200,000 Republicans ... France to also recover its historical memory” [4] and there is therefore likely to be certain bias to make the Spanish role seem greater than it really was.
 * __ Introduction __**
 * __ Investigation. __**
 * __ Structure of the Investigation. __**
 * __ Analysis of Sources. __**
 * Source 1 **

"La División Azul - Sangre Española en Rusia 1941-1945" [5] Xavier Moreno Juliá. The values of this source in terms of its origins are that the historian has experience in investigating the relationships between Germany and France, writing this source and another book after that. [6] In terms to its purpose, the book tries to inform of the sacrifice of the volunteers in such division and as such includes a very large amount of facts and figures and it is considered “ currently the best work available on this subject. ” [7] Yet this source does also prove to have certain limitations. In terms of it’s origins, the historian would have to find his information from pre-existing sources of the time and it seems that “Information from Russian sources is nonexistent” [8] meaning that the Russian perspective on this subject isn’t presented in his book, which is a certain limitation since the Russians were the ones the Blue Division fought against. In terms of it’s purpose the book could have certain bias which makes it depict the Spanish soldiers as heroes or that they didn’t support German policies but rather only wanted to fight communism, and thus separating them from the horrors committed by the Nazis. “Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II” Stanley G. Payne In terms of its origins, Stanley G. Payne is a well established and specialized historian when it comes to the study of Spain under the dictator Franco, writing an array of books revolving around this subject. [9] In terms of purpose, the author tried to solve the “the enigma of Spain's unique position during the war” [10] and to do so used information from the Fundacion Nacional Francisco Franco to base his research. Yet this source does prove to have certain limitations, the author has been accused of holding “little affection for Franco, pointing out his prejudices, blunders, and opportunism” [11] this would mean that the source would have a certain bias to depict Franco worse than he probably could have been. There is also the fact that he seems to have taken from mostly one place, which is trying to “defend the Franco regime's historical record” [12] meaning that he only disposed of one point of view to base his work from (however it must be kept in mind that this information was taken from the internet, so it might be incomplete and not fully informed). One of the main contributions by the Spanish in world war two was militarily, the republicans which had fled from Spain at the end of the civil war towards France were put into concentration camps or forced to join the French foreign legion, many then escaped to join the Free French Forces under general de Gaulle believing that after the war in France the allies would free Spain from Franco’s control, thus eventually constituting at least half of de Gaulle’s army. [13] The communists which had been living in the republican Spain had been rescued by the Soviets; yet again these believed that the Soviets would sooner or later go to Spain to provide a communist liberation to the country. On the axis’ side a division of volunteers was set up to “repay the civil war tribute in blood” [14] and thus the Blue Division was created. A clear example of how the Spanish were decisive can be seen in the company “La Nueve” of the Second armored Division under General Leclerc, The Spanish soldiers of this company were the first troops to land of all of the Free French forces, they were also the first to enter the city of Paris on the evening of the 24th of august and liberated the most important places of the capital, meeting with the resistance committee in the city council on the first day, and in addition conquered the hotel Meurice where the general Von Choltitz had set up his command post, thus proving the trust that General Leclerc had upon these men, which were also sent as the vanguard of the assault on Strasbourg. the 13th Demi-Brigade of the French Foreign legion was composed of 2000 men, of which 1000 were Spanish [15], the Battle of Bir Hakeim proves perfect evidence of the decisiveness of the Spanish involvement. On the 27th of May, Italian tanks broke the exterior perimeter and entered Bir Hakeim, here they were one by one persecuted by the Legionnaires, especially by the Spanish which had the most experience due to their time fighting tanks in the Spanish civil war, in some cases using improvised Molotov cocktails and shouting “Like in Madrid comrades!” [16] In the Eastern front on the side of the Soviets, there was the notable participation of the 4th company of the 1st special motorized brigade, composed exclusively of Spanish officers and soldiers. During the assault on Moscow by the Germans, they were ordered to defend the Kremlin itself by Stalin, and their mere presence (mostly due to the parity to the International Brigades) lifted the morale of the defenders. [17] However this evidence does not prove that the Spanish were extremely decisive on the allied side. Even though they landed the first of all the Free French Forces, they were not on the first of the allied landings, instead landing several weeks after D-Day on the first of august 1944. Notably, although the Nueve did liberate Paris, by the time they had arrived at the capital a resurrection had already started in the streets of Paris against the Germans, by the resistance. The liberation wasn’t an important objective militarily wise for the allies neither, since the Americans had planned to simply surround the city and blockade it into submission; it was rather a local political issue for the French. To add to this, the 13DB’s first intended participation in the war was in Finland, however due to the fact the Brigade needed to be trained to be able to fight in the winter conditions, they arrived too late, and the soviets and Finnish signed an armistice. It was then to be deployed into Norway to capture the Norwegian ports, especially Narvik, before the Germans did so. Once again they arrived late and the Germans beat them to it by invading on 9th April 1940. Even though the brigade spearheaded the assault and capture of Narvik, it was futile since it was ordered to withdraw immediately after and the last troops left Narvik on the 7th June 1940. There was also Spanish aid to the Nazis during the Second World War, in the form of the Blue Division, fighting in the eastern front. The first front assigned to the blue division was of 40 kilometers along the river Voljov. On the 19th October a small group of 36 men managed to cross the River Voljov, the following day, the rest of the battalion crossed and advanced without much resistance towards the town of Smeisko. On the 21st the Spanish controlled an area of 3km wide and 10km large over the other side of the river. [18] The Spanish continued advancing and on the 22nd they occupied Sitno, by which time they had received 48 casualties and inflicted 247 on the soviet troops [19]. By November the blue division arrived at the town of Possad, further into the Russian territory and impressing the Germans which told of the accomplishments of the division in the //Völkisher Beobachter [20] //. On the 27th of December the Russians attacked the “intermediate position”, one platoon was left holding the position faced against three Russian platoons. Reinforcements were sent, but the position was overrun, yet the reinforcements then underwent a vicious counter attack, re-capturing the said position. The Russians suffered, due to the defense and the counter attack, around 1080 casualties, no prisoners were made [21]. This division was essential for the Germans, to such extreme that although it’s numbers dwindling, General Ernst Busch refused to let go of “his Spanische Division” [22]. Yet, the division wasn’t given any of the vehicles by the Germans, and thus had to march by foot 900 kilometers to reach the front. Thus by the end of the trip 3013 men were incapable of fighting, and there were eleven deaths. Of the previously mentioned general Busch it is important to not that at the time when he refused to put the Blue Division away from the front, the nearest German division was in worse conditions, thus removing the Division effectively meant the destruction of the Germans. The Blue Division was dissolved on the 12th October by the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) after two years on the Russian front, being replaced by the Blue Legion, a smaller unit which in fact saw little action compared to the Blue Division. Finally an important argument which can prove that the Spanish were not decisive is seen with the few numbers that participated, the Spanish military casualties during world war two were of 12,000 which seems like a tiny number when compared to a country which had been involved in the war since the beginning like Britain which tolled to 326,000 [23]. One of the reasons why Hitler joined the civil war on the side of Franco was that he needed very important natural minerals from Spain, he stroke a deal with Franco with the Montana project where, Hitler was supposed to receive 75% of the natural minerals produced by Spain. However Franco never really accomplished his part, since he never sent any of the minerals to Hitler. An agreement was reached on 22nd of December 1939, providing for trade methods, while trying to maintain a balance between the two countries. There had been no agreement for the arrangement of the debt which the Spanish state had towards the Germans for their aid during the civil war, however an secret protocol signed on the 28 of February 1941 recognized a debt of 372 million Reich marks. The Wagner-Aktion scheme planned to import 60 million pesetas worth of Spanish raw materials. In 1941 imports from Germany amounted to 52 million pesetas while the exports totaled 161 million. However the economic aid provided by the Spanish, although extensive, was not much greater than that of other non-belligerent or neutral countries, with examples such as Sweden and Switzerland, with the Swiss economy providing financial aid and industrial production to Germany. The Spanish economy had been gravely damaged due to the civil war, the debt which the Spanish then had with the Nazis was actually not completely paid since no agreement was reached to do so until 1944, fact which the Spanish actually used to prevent the Germans from taking more resources using their mining companies. The Spanish actually spent more time asking for armaments which the Germans desperately needed themselves. Went to the British embassy to offer his services as a spy but they denied him, instead he went to the Germans and got accepted. He moved to Lisbon, were with the use of a map and newsreels. He claimed to be travelling around Britain and use a British Railway guide to calculate his expenses. Later he approached the British again, this time being accepted, he was moved to London in 1942 working for the XX committee, he pretended to have created a large group of agents throughout Britain. [24] Sometimes he had to explain why some of his agents had failed to report on certain occasions, such as his fictitious agent which “died” from a disease, Garbo’s misinformation was part of Operation fortitude, deceiving the Germans that the invasion of France would happen at pas de Calais. He Made the Germans believe that the Americans had in fact 50% more troops in the United kingdom that they in fact had, by creating the fictitious “FUSAG (First United Stated Army Group)” [25]. On the weeks preceding D-day he sent reports to the Germans based on information collected by his fictitious agents, managing to make it seem that the FUSAG was at the heart of all the allied operations. He managed convince the Germans that the main assault was still in Calais even after D-day, thus resulting in the Germans not sending reinforcements to the troops stationed in Normandy for fear of another landing further north. Not all of the espionage made by the Spanish was for the allies neither, Germany had set up a network of espionage in the neutral countries, the //KO-Spanien// was the largest one of them all, composed of 220 agents, mostly Spanish. [26] The focus of the organization was the espionage of Gibraltar, one of the German’s most important military objectives in the Mediterranean. The Japanese too used the Spanish to recollect information, since after the attack on Pearl Harbor they had no intelligence about the Americans. Nonetheless, Garbo although, being the main man in the operation, didn’t work alone, having a large amount of MI5 supervisors and co-agents which wrote and directed what Garbo had to re-transmit to the Germans. Most of the important decisions weren’t taken by Garbo himself but rather by the deception planners at the Supreme headquarters allied expeditionary force (SHAEF). [27] Garbo too was very fortunate due to the incompetence of the Abwehr in Madrid, were for example the radio operator turned off the radio the night before OPERATION OVERLORD came into place, where Garbo was supposed to warn the Nazis of the invasion to keep his cover. Also the fact that the Germans did not detect his dubious amount of information as his supervisor said “it is doubt whether, in reality, one man could have done all the work…attributed to Garbo.” [28] Although the Spanish network set up by the Germans was extensive, it was also highly ineffective. The observation posts which over-watched Gibraltar were quickly closed down due to pressure by the allies, and the information sent to the Japanese was usually of very bad quality, some even pure creation of the agents. Probably one of the most important methods of Spain’s collaboration was pro-Nazi propaganda in Spain itself. The Grosse plan, thought of by the Germans (Stohrer and his Press attaché), and received the support of Franco and his minister of interior. The plan was made to enhance German propaganda and restrict that of the allies. Although originally sketched by the Germans, the plan was to be carried out almost exclusively by Spanish personnel. The structure of the plan is as follows: “Group A: Composed of around 500,000 pro German Spanish, this group would be responsible of receiving the propaganda Group B: formed within the Spanish postal system, goal of facilitating the entry of German +intercepting the flow of allied propaganda Group C: Set up amongst the FET (Falange Española Tradicionalista) and facilitated the distribution of propaganda, Identifying allied propaganda and giving details about its channels, sources and recipients. Group D: Set up in the ‘Direccion General de Seguridad’, using Spanish police to gather information about allied propaganda and use means, official and unofficial, to battle it. Group E: least important, composed of people which had been in republican prisons during the civil war.” [29] However, The Spanish did not provide many funds themselves, forcing the Germans to collect money from German businesses in Spain. The Spanish governments itself provided a decree which restricted the flow of foreign propaganda in Spain; the only allowed to be sent were official bulletins, and these to government officials only. Spain was heavily controlled by the Allied imports from overseas, meaning that in order not to lose those vital imports, the propaganda had to be severely toned down and the pro-German news had to be limited. Spanish ships were used for the transport of German Diplomatic correspondence and intelligence was transported across the Atlantic. The Germans established an enterprise in Spain called “Compañia Maritima de Transportes” [30], recorded as a Spanish firm which received the authorization of the Falangist minister of industry and commerce, Demetrio Carceller to use 5 ships to engage in trade in the western Mediterranean. These ships would transport supplies to the German forces using the Spanish flag to protect them from the British interdiction, moving around 125, 000 tons of supplies to North Africa within a period of ten months during 1941-42. [31] On the other hand, the British soon noticed these operations taking action to counter them. They prohibited any ships of more than 500 tons to sail in the Mediterranean without British permission and the Spanish government was ordered to tell Spanish ships leaving Spain to return immediately. Further more, the British bought as much Spanish shipping as it was possible to them and by 1942 they had used up to 3£ million to do so, the result being that by 1942 resupply of German troops became increasingly desperate. [32] Until now in this investigation I have analyzed ways that Spain could or could not have been decisive in three different areas, military aid, economic aid and covert operations. Yet a different interpretation of this question could be that, maybe Spain’s greatest input to this war, was in fact contributing to the outbreak of it. The Spanish civil war can be considered as the dressing rehearsal for world war two. Spain was at the time a republic, with close links with the soviets. When Franco started his rebellion, Spain quickly became a both a political and military between fascism and democracy. Hitler quickly sided with Franco and provided aid for him; his motives were economic and military. As mentioned earlier in this investigation, under Montana project Franco was to provide 75% of natural minerals to Hitler if he won the war. Hitler also used this as a training ground and showcase of the German military force. With the infamous bombing of Guernica he sent a clear message to the democracies, the message being that he could strike anywhere in their country. Mussolini provided help to Franco too, effectively driving Italy closer to Germany, breaking the stresa pact; this was then acknowledged by the creation of the rome-berlin axis in 1936 and strengthened further by the anti-comintern pact of 1937 and the pact of steel two years later. Yet while the fascist countries became involved and grew closer together, the democracies decided to try to maintain themselves out of it. Signing the Non-Intervention agreement in 1936 (Germany and Italy signed too but ignored it). The republic asked for help but the only official help it received came in form or Russian military advisors. However although the governments forbid to help the Spanish Republic in the civil war, many civilians joined the International brigades to fight for democracy. This investigation has sought to answer the question how decisive was Spanish intervention in world war two? The evidence and arguments considered has led me to the conclusion that the answer to this question is that they were not that decisive in terms of the whole of the world war, but rather decisive in small and localized victories. When looking at the individual factors, militarily the Spanish intervention was only important in a very tiny scale, the “Nueve” although an important asset for the liberation of Paris was of not any more importance than the rest of the companies under Leclerc’s command. Most importantly the factor in military intervention which makes it seem as the Spaniards weren’t that decisive was the few numbers. Economically as seen in this investigation although Spain did provide some aid to Germany compared to other countries this contribution yet again becomes too small to prove significant. In the covert operation section it is demonstrated that the help provided by Garbo was of great aid, allowing the Normandy disembarking to occur, but he was aided and guided by members of the MI5, therefore proved only to be a tool to trick the Germans rather than the mastermind of the operation. Nevertheless, my studies demonstrate that there are clearly problems with reaching a final answer to the question because the source material is very scarce, there is very few recollections of the Spanish intervention, most likely because she wasn’t an official belligerent in the war, therefore no one really expects there to have been any intervention on their part. First hand stories of the implication of Spaniards in the war are very scarce, since the veterans decided to keep quiet about their stories due to the fact they felt betrayed. This question can also have multiple different answers, although maybe economically there wasn’t a big difference made, in terms of military aid and in the case of the French side the Spanish aid proved to be invaluable.
 * Source 2 **
 * Source 3 **
 * __ Analysis. __**
 * Military **
 * Economy **
 * Covert Operations **
 * Different Interpretation **
 * __ Conclusion __**

Books. · Mesquida, Evelyn (2010), La Nueve: Los españoles que liberaron Paris. Zeta. · Moreno julia, Xavier (2005), La División azul: Sangre española en Rusia 1941-1945. Critica. · Payne, Stanley G. (2008). Franco and Hitler. New Haven: Yale University Press, (ISBN: 0300122829). · Reyes, Luis (1990), Españoles en la segunda guerra mundial. Aldaba Militaria. · Seaman, Mark (2004), Garbo: The Spy who save D-Day. The National Archives. Websites. · Gonzalez Harbour, Berna (Date accessed: 30/7/2010) [] · Nofi, A.A, (Date Accessed: 28/8/2010) available at: [] (28/8/2010) · Nuñez Florenzio, Rafael (Date accessed: 28/8/2010) available at: [] [] · Unknown, (Date Accessed: 28/8/2010) available at: [] · Unknown, (Date accessed: 30/8/2010) [] · Viñas, Angel Date Accessed: 28/8/2010) Available at: []  Other:   · Harris, Tomàs Summary of the Garbo Case 1941-1945 (Official report)
 * __ Bibliography __**

[1] Translation: « The Ninth: The Spaniards who liberated Paris. » [2] Gonzalez Harbour, Berna (Date accessed: 30/7/2010) [] “ 10 años a entrelazar los hilos de un relato infinito que jamás estuvo en los libros de historia franceses  ” [3] Ibid « una meticulosa reconstrucción de la historia nunca reconocida de los republicanos que lucharon contra el nazismo y que liberaron París.» [4] Ibid « Mi objetivo es que Francia reconozca que debe una parte de su libertad a más de 200.000 republicanos ... que Francia también recupere su memoria histórica» [5] Translation: “The Blue Division – Spanish Blood in Russia 1941-1945” [6] List of books by this author: · Xavier Moreno (2004)   [|La División Azul. Sangre española en Rusia 1941-1945]. Critica. · Xavier Moreno (2007) Hitler y Franco. Planeta. [7] Nuñez Florenzio, Rafael (Date accessed: 28/8/2010) available at: [] “hoy por hoy la mejor obra disponible sobre este asunto” [8] Ibid (28/8/2010) “la información de fuentes rusas brilla por su ausencia” [9] List of Books written by Stanley G. Payne in chronological order: · Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism, 1961 · Politics and the Military in Modern Spain, 1967 · Franco's Spain, 1967 · The Spanish Revolution, 1970 · A History of Spain and Portugal, 1973 · Basque Nationalism, 1975 · La revolución y la guerra civil española, 1976 · Fascism: Comparison and Definition, 1980 · Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview, 1984 · The Franco Regime 1936-1975, 1988 · Franco: El perfil de la historia, 1992 · Spain's First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936, 1993 · A History of Fascism 1914-1945, 1996 · El primer franquismo, 1939-1959: Los años de la autarquía, 1998 · Fascism in Spain 1923-1977, 2000 · The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism 1931-1939, 2004 · The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-1936, 2006 · Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II, 2008 [10] Unknown, (Date Accessed: 28/8/2010) available at: [] [11] Nofi, A.A, (Date Accessed: 28/8/2010) available at: [] (28/8/2010) [12] Viñas, Angel Date Accessed: 28/8/2010) Available at: [] [13] (1990), Luis Reyes, Españoles pg 20 [14] (2008, Stanley G. Payne, pg 147 )  [15] (1990), Luis Reyes, Españoles  [16] (1990) Luis Reyes, Españoles en la segunda guerra mundial, « Como en Madrid camaradas !” [17] (1990), Luis Reyes, Españoles  [18] (2005) Xavier Moreno julia, La Division azul : Sangre española en Rusia 1941-1945, [19] ibid [20] Ibid Pg 164 [21] (2005) Xavier Moreno julia, La Division azul : Sangre española en Rusia 1941-1945, [22] ibid [23] Unknown, (Date accessed: 30/8/2010) [] [24] Mark Seaman (2004), Garbo: The Spy who save D-Day. The National Archives. [25] Summary of the Garbo Case 1941-1945 Tomàs Harris [26] ibid [27] ibid [28] Mark Seaman (2004), Garbo: The Spy who save D-Day. The National Archives. [29] Stanley G. Payne (2008). Franco and Hitler. New Haven: Yale University Press, (ISBN: 0300122829). [30] ibid [31] ibid [32] ibid